Oaxaca governor Gabino Cué announced that the state has so far set aside 2.4 billion pesos for social programs similar to those in Mexico City championed first by Andrés Manuel López Obrador and then expanded by Marcelo Ebrard:
* 500 pesos paid monthly to 35,000 seniors
* 1,500 pesos paid to single mothers who have lost their jobs, for a maximum of three months
* Health and social insurance to 25,000 persons suffering from some kind of disability.
Friday, March 4, 2011
SNTE bashed in Senate: Ricardo Monreal diatribe against "corrupt" Elba Esther Gordillo
It is seldom I find myself much in agreement with former Zacatecas governor, now-Senator Ricardo Monreal, though I make an exception for Monreal's colorful outbursts in yesterday's session in the Senate:
"There is in the world no more corrupt union than SNTE. There is no more corrupt woman in the country than Elba Esther Gordillo. Investigate her, and investigate me. I have no respect for a political union that keeps our education on the ground. I will not tolerate attacks. I do not fear their money or power; I am going to take on that woman, you and your union. Governors, legislators, and the president are afraid, but I am not. Here you will have me from today onward, fighting for the union to be transparent with its resources, because nobody knows how it is actually managed."Can't say I disagree with this assessment. I hope Monreal actually will follow through on this quest.
Beatriz Paredes steps down; PRI president-elect Humberto Moreira offically takes charge
Today, Beatriz Paredes Rangel will officially step down as national leader of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), and Humberto Moreira, governor-on-leave-of-absence from Coahuila, will take her place.
In this regard, Joaquín López-Dóriga has a very useful run-down of her achievements, as well as failures. Paredes took power March 4, 2007 (NOT 2008, as López-Dóriga erroneously states). Since then:
* In the 2009 federal elections, PRI won 188 of 300 single-member districts, which is a higher achievement than in 2003, 2000, and even 1997 (though note PRI still does not have a majority on its own - it lost its 2/3 majority in 1988, and simple majority in 1997)
* In 2009, PRI lost Sonora for the first time (an upset mainly due to the ABC child care scandal), yet won the five others at stake, including recovering San Luis Potosí and Querétaro from PAN.
* In 2010, PRI famously lost Oaxaca, Puebla, and Sinaloa, yet won the nine other states at sake, including recovering Tlaxcala and Aguascalientes from PAN and Zacatecas from the PRD.
* In 2011, the PRI lost both gubernatorial elections so far: Guerrero remained with the PRD, while in Baja California Sur, PAN defeated the PRD.
From 2008, PRI under Paredes won 14 governorships - Nuevo León, Colima, Campeche, San Luis Potosí, Querétaro, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Durango, Hidalgo, Veracruz, Tlaxcala, Aguascalientes and Zacatecas - and lost six: Sonora, Sinaloa, Oaxaca, Puebla, Guerrero and Baja California Sur.
That means, as López-Dóriga calculates, that PRI had 18 states in 2008, PAN 8, and PRD 8, while today it has 19 states, PAN 5, PRD 5, and the PAN-PRD alliances 3.
(he doesn't include 2007, the year Paredes became president; then, PRI won Yucatán from PAN, while PRD maintained Michoacán)
How much of it can be attributed to Paredes? According to her collaborators, she was instrumental in choosing the gubernatorial candidates, and has certainly worked hard to restructure and reposition the PRI as a possible winning party in 2012. Yet the most recent defeats this year in Guerrero and Baja California Sur comprise a strong psychological blow to the "steamroller" image the PRI had obtained particularly after the 2009 federal election, as do of course the 2009 losses of Oaxaca, Puebla, and Sinaloa, states where the PRI had never relinquished power.
The party, moreover, remains highly programatically and ideologically diffuse, wracked with personality clashes and divisions, and, to be sure, as vertical and lacking in any semblance of internal democracy: The party is as authoritarian as ever.
Now it is up to Humberto Moreira to finally position the PRI ahead of the 2012 presidential contest. The PRI is a very clear favorite in Coahuila, but in Nayarit the PRD, possibly with PAN, stands a very good chance of winning, and of course in Mexico State, things are still very much in the open, though a non-PRI victory is extremely unlikely unless PRD-PAN will present a common candidate.
It will be an exciting electoral spring.
In this regard, Joaquín López-Dóriga has a very useful run-down of her achievements, as well as failures. Paredes took power March 4, 2007 (NOT 2008, as López-Dóriga erroneously states). Since then:
* In the 2009 federal elections, PRI won 188 of 300 single-member districts, which is a higher achievement than in 2003, 2000, and even 1997 (though note PRI still does not have a majority on its own - it lost its 2/3 majority in 1988, and simple majority in 1997)
* In 2009, PRI lost Sonora for the first time (an upset mainly due to the ABC child care scandal), yet won the five others at stake, including recovering San Luis Potosí and Querétaro from PAN.
* In 2010, PRI famously lost Oaxaca, Puebla, and Sinaloa, yet won the nine other states at sake, including recovering Tlaxcala and Aguascalientes from PAN and Zacatecas from the PRD.
* In 2011, the PRI lost both gubernatorial elections so far: Guerrero remained with the PRD, while in Baja California Sur, PAN defeated the PRD.
From 2008, PRI under Paredes won 14 governorships - Nuevo León, Colima, Campeche, San Luis Potosí, Querétaro, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Durango, Hidalgo, Veracruz, Tlaxcala, Aguascalientes and Zacatecas - and lost six: Sonora, Sinaloa, Oaxaca, Puebla, Guerrero and Baja California Sur.
That means, as López-Dóriga calculates, that PRI had 18 states in 2008, PAN 8, and PRD 8, while today it has 19 states, PAN 5, PRD 5, and the PAN-PRD alliances 3.
(he doesn't include 2007, the year Paredes became president; then, PRI won Yucatán from PAN, while PRD maintained Michoacán)
How much of it can be attributed to Paredes? According to her collaborators, she was instrumental in choosing the gubernatorial candidates, and has certainly worked hard to restructure and reposition the PRI as a possible winning party in 2012. Yet the most recent defeats this year in Guerrero and Baja California Sur comprise a strong psychological blow to the "steamroller" image the PRI had obtained particularly after the 2009 federal election, as do of course the 2009 losses of Oaxaca, Puebla, and Sinaloa, states where the PRI had never relinquished power.
The party, moreover, remains highly programatically and ideologically diffuse, wracked with personality clashes and divisions, and, to be sure, as vertical and lacking in any semblance of internal democracy: The party is as authoritarian as ever.
Now it is up to Humberto Moreira to finally position the PRI ahead of the 2012 presidential contest. The PRI is a very clear favorite in Coahuila, but in Nayarit the PRD, possibly with PAN, stands a very good chance of winning, and of course in Mexico State, things are still very much in the open, though a non-PRI victory is extremely unlikely unless PRD-PAN will present a common candidate.
It will be an exciting electoral spring.
How long can Carlos Pascual remain the U.S. ambassador to Mexico? "Don't help me, compadre"
It's front page news in Milenio and La Jornada, and certainly has its fair share of media attention in the United States as well (Washington Post, Wall Street Journal):
President Felipe Calderón is extremely critical of the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, Carlos Pascual, and is stating it pretty much as directly as he can. Asked directly if he had still confidence in Pascual and could still work with him - Pascual's wikileaked disparaging comments on Mexican security efforts have been particularly galling - Calderón replied: "It's difficult to build and it's easy to lose."
Calderón also said sarcastically, "Don't help me, compadre," a reference to what is regarded as less-than-helpful help from the U.S. embassy and State department.
Despite the notable praise of Calderón and Obama for each other, and the seemingly very tangible result of ending the NAFTA trucking dispute, the Pascual case remains a sore. One anonymous U.S. official noted after the meeting, "We stand by our official... and that was that."
Yet this is surely an untenable situation in the long run: The Mexican government has absolutely no confidence in Pascual and wants him out, while Obama sticks by him.
How long will he last?
President Felipe Calderón is extremely critical of the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, Carlos Pascual, and is stating it pretty much as directly as he can. Asked directly if he had still confidence in Pascual and could still work with him - Pascual's wikileaked disparaging comments on Mexican security efforts have been particularly galling - Calderón replied: "It's difficult to build and it's easy to lose."
Calderón also said sarcastically, "Don't help me, compadre," a reference to what is regarded as less-than-helpful help from the U.S. embassy and State department.
Despite the notable praise of Calderón and Obama for each other, and the seemingly very tangible result of ending the NAFTA trucking dispute, the Pascual case remains a sore. One anonymous U.S. official noted after the meeting, "We stand by our official... and that was that."
Yet this is surely an untenable situation in the long run: The Mexican government has absolutely no confidence in Pascual and wants him out, while Obama sticks by him.
How long will he last?
Highly recommended read on Mexican politics: Weintraub's "Unequal Partners: The United States and Mexico"
A book I've meant to say a few words about for a while: Sidney Weintraub's 2010 "Unequal Partners: The United States and Mexico." It is a short, succinct, and highly readable account of current Mexican politics and economy that I recommend wholeheartedly.
Weintraub is an emeritus professor at the University of Texas, where he first started teaching in 1976, and though he is trained as an economist - he was an early proponent of U.S.-Mexican economic integration since the early 1980s - he is as well a very astute political observer and analyst. Also, it should be added, while the book is published by the rightleaning Center for Strategic and International Studies, this is no ideological tract, but a very well written balanced account of U.S-Mexican relations - and much more.
First on the U.S-Mexican relationship. Weintraub's two guiding hypotheses are as follows:
1) The belief that Mexico approaches the United States with diffidence because of its sense of dependence; and 2) That the U.S. reaction to Mexican proposals, or when the United States submits its own initiatives that affect Mexico, is as the dominant player (p. 6)
These are "tested" throughout the book in the areas of trade, FDI and finance, narcotics, energy, migration, and the border. Significantly, though, he argues that Mexico in the past decade has become much more assertive and insistent, while the U.S. has become less dominant, and uses examples such as Fox's opposition to the Iraq war, the Merida initiative, demanded by Mexico, immigration, and the NAFTA trucking dispute to demonstrate this change. Given the most recent news coming out of Calderón's visit to Washington, where a deal appears to have been made (after Mexico finally slapped expensive yet fully legal sanctions on U.S. products), the argument is interesting.
Yet the book also offers some highly succinct and readable accounts where the focus is often on domestic developments in Mexico:
* An excellent review of Mexican economic history and the ISI model (Weintraub met Raúl Prebisch on a range of occasions)
* A very balanced account on NAFTA: "There is no logic in the argument that Mexican GDP growth faltered because its exports increased – and this is what the ‘blame NAFTA’ arguments amount to" (p. 35) - though he also admit NAFTA was indeed oversold on both sides (he might also emphasized here as well that it was hardly a deal made between two democratic countries - how relevant was that to the outcome?)
* A very good review of Mexico's opening and turn toward Foreign Direct Investment, and the 1994-5 economic crisis, with ensuing bank bailout
* A poignant commentary on the 2009 economic crisis: “unlike the slow economic growth during much of the past thirty-five years, the fault is no primarily Mexico’s.” (p. 59).
* A very balanced and pragmatic view on the drug "war," summed up simply and effectively:
*Great chapter on immigration, exposing the perennial U.S. hypocrisy on this topic:
And so forth. Again, this is written by an economist who is strongly in favor of U.S.-Mexican economic integration and freer trade and more financial flows, but it is a wonderfully balanced work.
Weintraub is an emeritus professor at the University of Texas, where he first started teaching in 1976, and though he is trained as an economist - he was an early proponent of U.S.-Mexican economic integration since the early 1980s - he is as well a very astute political observer and analyst. Also, it should be added, while the book is published by the rightleaning Center for Strategic and International Studies, this is no ideological tract, but a very well written balanced account of U.S-Mexican relations - and much more.
First on the U.S-Mexican relationship. Weintraub's two guiding hypotheses are as follows:
1) The belief that Mexico approaches the United States with diffidence because of its sense of dependence; and 2) That the U.S. reaction to Mexican proposals, or when the United States submits its own initiatives that affect Mexico, is as the dominant player (p. 6)
These are "tested" throughout the book in the areas of trade, FDI and finance, narcotics, energy, migration, and the border. Significantly, though, he argues that Mexico in the past decade has become much more assertive and insistent, while the U.S. has become less dominant, and uses examples such as Fox's opposition to the Iraq war, the Merida initiative, demanded by Mexico, immigration, and the NAFTA trucking dispute to demonstrate this change. Given the most recent news coming out of Calderón's visit to Washington, where a deal appears to have been made (after Mexico finally slapped expensive yet fully legal sanctions on U.S. products), the argument is interesting.
Yet the book also offers some highly succinct and readable accounts where the focus is often on domestic developments in Mexico:
* An excellent review of Mexican economic history and the ISI model (Weintraub met Raúl Prebisch on a range of occasions)
* A very balanced account on NAFTA: "There is no logic in the argument that Mexican GDP growth faltered because its exports increased – and this is what the ‘blame NAFTA’ arguments amount to" (p. 35) - though he also admit NAFTA was indeed oversold on both sides (he might also emphasized here as well that it was hardly a deal made between two democratic countries - how relevant was that to the outcome?)
* A very good review of Mexico's opening and turn toward Foreign Direct Investment, and the 1994-5 economic crisis, with ensuing bank bailout
* A poignant commentary on the 2009 economic crisis: “unlike the slow economic growth during much of the past thirty-five years, the fault is no primarily Mexico’s.” (p. 59).
* A very balanced and pragmatic view on the drug "war," summed up simply and effectively:
"The problems between the two countries will persist as long as drug marketers in Mexico can generate the large income that they receive for supplying an illegal product in great demand in the United States” (p. 76-77)*An excellent chapter on the oil industry, and the absurdity of not allowing any risk contracts: Mexico's current legislation on petroleum is more restrictive than Cuba's! Also, a stark assessment of PEMEX's strengths and weaknesses - though he notably does not favor privatizing the company.
*Great chapter on immigration, exposing the perennial U.S. hypocrisy on this topic:
"The door for entry into the United States was deliberately left half-open: people could cross without papers and have jobs waiting for them; and then the blame for what was taking place could be shifted to the poor Mexican whose intent was to find a better life. It has not been a story that casts glory on the United States” (p. 105)* Rips to shreds the argument that Mexican trucks are dangerous and that allowing them would be bad for the environment - rather, points out the madness of the current situation where three vehicles must now be involved, including hours spent idling at the border.
And so forth. Again, this is written by an economist who is strongly in favor of U.S.-Mexican economic integration and freer trade and more financial flows, but it is a wonderfully balanced work.
Yet another Guanajuato functionary steps down after "irregularities"
Jorge Armado Aguirre Torres was until he was removed this week ecretary of health in the Guanajuato state administration. After "irregularities" was detected in the managing of the Seguro Popular, the health insurance program for the poorest Mexicans without a job-provided health insurance in the formal sector, Aguirre Torres became the eighth state official of secretary rank to step down in the four years since Juan Manuel Oliva became the governor of Guanajuato.
Juan Manuel Oliva has been embroiled in a wide range of very dirty scandals the past months - read more here and here - that directly implicate the yunquista governor. As ever more attention is put on his scandal-ridden government, expect more stories to surface the coming months.
Juan Manuel Oliva has been embroiled in a wide range of very dirty scandals the past months - read more here and here - that directly implicate the yunquista governor. As ever more attention is put on his scandal-ridden government, expect more stories to surface the coming months.
Mexico City electoral institute wants expatriate voters for 2012 mayor election
The electoral institute of the Federal District-Mexico City, IEDF, announced it would work toward allowing residents of Mexico City outside of Mexico - about half a million defeños are estimated to live abroad - to vote in the 2012 election for mayor of Mexico City.
DF will then join Zacatecas and Michoacán in terms of allowing its expatriates to vote on the local executive.
No details were released on exactly how this will be achieved; with the 2006 failure in mind, where only a tiny fraction of those residing abroad (meaning the United States) actually voted - a result that a recent (2010) scholarly work by James McCann, Wayne Cornelius, and David Lea ("Absentee Voting and Transnational Civic Engagement among Mexican Expatriates," in this edited volume) attributed chiefly to high bureaucratic hurdles - clearly the IEDF needs to take proactive steps to make this a real option.
DF will then join Zacatecas and Michoacán in terms of allowing its expatriates to vote on the local executive.
No details were released on exactly how this will be achieved; with the 2006 failure in mind, where only a tiny fraction of those residing abroad (meaning the United States) actually voted - a result that a recent (2010) scholarly work by James McCann, Wayne Cornelius, and David Lea ("Absentee Voting and Transnational Civic Engagement among Mexican Expatriates," in this edited volume) attributed chiefly to high bureaucratic hurdles - clearly the IEDF needs to take proactive steps to make this a real option.
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